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Inducement as Contributory Copyright Infringement: 




Until fairly recently, the mass distribution of sound and video recordings has 
proceeded unimpeded by parallel developments in the ability to make inex-
pensive (and unauthorized) copies of that content. Before the digital age, 
copying (such as the use of a cassette recorder to make copies of music 
played over the radio) posed little threat to the market for such recordings 
because those copies were highly imperfect, took considerable time to create, 
133 Report on Responses to the Europea n Commission Green Paper on Counterfe iting and 
Piracy, 7 June 1999, <http://europa.eu.inr/comm/internal_marketlen/indprop/piracy/ 
pi racyen. pdf>. 
• Assistant Professor of Law at the College of William & Mary's Marshall-Wythe School 
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and were difficult to distribute widely without great effort. As a resul t, such 
copying was, at least implicitly, treated as fair use and in many cases should 
have been seen as unobjectionable in any event. With the prevalence of 
media in digital form, and the adoption of broadband technologies that 
enable communications over the internet in fractions of a second, the impact 
on di stribution from copying has ceased to be a latent concern. Because 
copies of digital content are virtually indistinguishable from the original, and 
distribution can take place both broadly and quickly, conten t owners now 
have a more robust- although as yet unproven- clai m that such distribution 
will harm traditional markets and distribution models for creative content 
and therefore ca nnot be seen as fair use. 1 
Even where copying is unlawful , however, that should not necessarily mean 
that the distributors of the technology used to engage in such copying should 
also be liable for infringement. When a copy of protected content is made, 
some device, software, or other product must be used in the endeavor, 
whether a cassette recorder, a video tape recorder, or softwa re that enables 
digital copies. Despite the fact that the e technologies are genera ll y agnostic 
as to the particular nature of their use, content owner have pursued not 
only wrongful end users for their infringing activities but also the intermedi-
aries who, content owners claim, contribute to and profit from end user 
infringement by distributing such technologies. Chief among these efforts 
was litigation brought by the Recording lndu try Association of America 
(RJAA) and others against Napster, a service that ena bled end users to locate 
files and download them from other users across the internet. In a suit that 
culminated in an appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, Napster was found to be subject to both contributory and vicarious 
liability for its users' copyright infringement, resulting primarily from the 
structure of the Napster system, which routed all sea rch queries through a 
central server maintained and controlled by Napster. 2 It was this centraliza-
tion that led the appeals court to conclude that Napster knowingly contrib-
uted to infringement and financially benefited from an acti vity within irs 
control. 3 As a result, apster was required, in response to notice from the 
content owners, to remove access to infringing content listed on its servers or 
face lia bility, a task that ultimately ended the service as it then existed.4 
The next generation of internet file exchange networks differs in one signifi-
cant respect from Napster. Rather than relying on a central search index 
stored on a server controlled by a single entity, the software creating these 
networks facilitates sea rches among the computers participating in the net-
work at a particular time, distributing search request along the transient 
network until the requested file is found, then enabling a direct link between 
l Indeed, it may we ll be rhe case that such distribution crea tes new markets for content by 
introducing consumers ro conrenr with which they were previously unfamilia r. 
2 A& M Records, Inc. v. Naps ter, l1tC., 239 F.Jd 1004 (9th Cir. 2001 ). 
3 I d. a t l 022, I 024. 
4 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 E3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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the requesting computer and the source computer to transmit the file. (These 
types of networks are typically referred to as "peer-to-peer" (or "P2P") 
networks because the exchange takes place directly between two computers 
at the sa me organizational level of the network, functioning as both clients 
and servers ("peers").) 
From a user's perspective, a peer-to-peer network yields potentially quicker 
searches and access to a wider array of sources than are available through a 
apster-type service (albeit with the concomitant risk of decreased quality 
control). Because distribution over a peer-to-peer network does not rely on 
each search request's passing through a central computer server, there is less 
of a risk of the network's fai ling entirely when one computer fails .5 From the 
content provider's perspective, however, such networks are moving litigation 
targets because no one entity controls the flow of traffic over the network. 
The more stable targets, in the content providers' view, are the distributors 
of the software that ena bled the networks to fo rm, even though the software 
itself is not des igned to distribute any panicular type of file . The question for 
the courts in the case brought against some of those distributors, Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,6 was whether the distributors 
maintained a sufficient level of involvement with the infringing activity that 
took place using their software post-distribution to be deemed liable for that 
infringement _? The case was ultimately heard by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
which issued its opinion in June 2005. 8 As with the lower courts before it, 
the Court's cha llenge was to provide an answer to this question that re -
mained faithful to the central goal of copyright law: providing copyright 
protection sufficient to encourage production of creative works without 
sti fling the development of technology. 
II. Contributory Copyright Infringement 
U.S. copyright laws give the author of a work a number of exclusive rights; 
those rights allow the copyright owner to exploit the work in certain ways 
for a limited time per iod and to bring suit against those who violate those 
rights. 9 But it has long been the case that it is not solely the direct infringer 
5 Metro-Goldwyn-Ma}'er Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Cr. 2764, 2770 (2005 ); see 
this issue of IIC at 124. Of course, it is the very lack of centra lization tha t leads to a lack 
of control over network resources. /d. n.l . 
6 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Groks ter, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1032 (C.D. 
Cal. 2001), a{('d, 380 !'.3d 1154 (9th Ci r. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Cr. 2764 (2005). 
7 Alrhough the conten t owners sought to hold the softwa re distributors liable both on a 
theory of cont ributory copyright infringement and on a theory of vicarious copyright in-
fringement, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision focused only on contributory infringement. 
Groks ter, 125 S. Ct. at 2776. 
8 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). 
9 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102 (su bject matter of copyright); id. § I 06 (exclusive rights of copyright 
owner); id. § 302 (duration of copy right for works created on or after January 1, 1978); id. 
§ SO I (infr ingement of copyright ). But see 17 U.S. C. § 107 (fair use limitations on exclusive 
rights ). 
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who is liable for copyright infringement. As in the common law, those who 
knowingly contribute to another's copyright infringement can also be held 
liable for the underlying acts. 
The doctrine of contributory copyright infringement was articulated in 
Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc. , 10 in 
which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit set forth a now often 
cited statement defining when one party can be held liable for contributing 
to the copyright infringement of another: when the defendant "induces, 
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct'' with "knowledge 
of the infringing activity." 11 Such conduct generally takes two forms: either 
personal conduct that furthers the infringement or contribution of the means 
of infringement. 12 In Gershwin, an artist management agency was held to be 
contributorily liable for infringement caused by the unauthorized perfor-
mance of copyrighted songs in community concerts it was largely responsible 
for organizing. Although the agency knew which songs would be performed 
in advance of the concerts, it made no effort to obtain copyright clearance. JJ 
Similarly, in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 14 the owners of a swap 
meet were held liable for the infringing records sold at many of its booths 
where the owners had been informed of the infringing activity and continued 
to provide the support services that allowed the swap meet to operate. 15 
These cases did not answer the question of whether the provider of a product 
or service that contributed to copyright infringement in some, but not 
substantially all, instances (or only in connection with some uses) would also 
be subject to liability. The U.S. Supreme Court gave at least a partial answer 
to this question in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios. 16 Sony 
involved a contributory copyright infringement suit brought by the owners 
of the copyright in certain television programs against the manufacturer of 
video tape recorders . Purchasers of these recorders were engaged in both 
infringing uses (taping programs to create a personal "library" for home use) 
and noninfringing uses ("time-shifting" programs by taping them to watch 
later). Given that the majority concluded that Sony did not actively encour-
age buyers to engage in copyright infringement by, for example, including 
recommendations to that effect in its advertising or in its instruction manual 
(although the dissenting justices took some issue with this conclusion 17), the 
question before the Court was whether the mere sale of video tape recorders 
to the general public was a knowing, material contribution to copyright 
infringement that could give rise to liability. Sony knew, the Court con-
10 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971 ). 
11 ld. at 1162 (footnote omirted) . 
12 See, e.g. , 3-12 '"t immer on copyright," § 12.04 (2005). 
13 Gershwin, 443 F.2d ar 1163. 
14 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). 
15 /d. at 264. 
16 464 u.s. 417 (1984). 
17 /d. at 459 (Biackmun,]., dissenting) . 
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eluded, that some of its customers were using its recorders to make un-
authorized copies of copyrighted material, even though not all of the uses 
constituted copyright infringement and even though it did not have actual 
knowledge of which consumers were engaged in lawful uses and which were 
not. 
The Court recognized that if it deemed Sony to have the requisite level of 
knowledge for liability based simply on constructive knowledge - in other 
words, based on the fact that Sony could assume some of its customers were 
using the recorder to make copies of protected material - the sale of any 
technology that had both legal and illegal uses would be highly restricted. 
The photocopier, the camera, and the computer, to take three examples, 
would fail under such a standard. As the Court put it, when "a charge of 
contributory infringement is predicated entirely on the sale of an article of 
commerce that is used by the purchaser to infringe ... , the public interest in 
access to that article of commerce is necessarily implicated." 18 If Sony had 
been liable for the mere act of distributing video tape recorders because 
some customers used them tO engage in in&ingement, distribution would 
almost certainly have ceased entirely, thus ending even lawful uses outside 
the scope of the exclusive rights of the content owners. Thus, the Court held 
that ''the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of 
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is ... 
capable of substantial noninfringing uses" (or, as the Court also put it, 
"commercially significant noninfringing uses"). 19 The sale of video tape 
recorders could continue unimpeded by copyright law.20 
Under the Sony standard, the "material contribution plus knowledge of the 
infringing activity" basis of contributory liability cannot be sa tisfied by the 
mere sale or di stribution of a product or technology used by some customers 
for infringement with the constructive knowledge that infringing activity is 
taking place. The standard embodies two important limitations on liability. 
First, it recognizes the difference between knowledge acquired before the 
product is distributed and knowledge acquired afterward. The theory behind 
this standard is that if the product has only infringing uses (or trivial 
noninfringing ones), then the defendant can be charged with knowledge of 
the later uses to which its customers will put the product - because all of 
them are infringing, the defendant knows at the time he distributes the 
product that he is contributing to copyright infringement. But if the product 
is capable of su bstantial noninfringing uses, then the defendant cannot be 
18 Td. at 440. 
19 Id. at 442. The standard was based on the ''staple article of commerce" theo ry from 
patent law, pursuant to which the sale of a "staple a rticle or commodity of commerce 
suitable for substantial noninfringing use" is nor contributory patent infringement. See id. 
at 440; 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). 
20 Indeed, the conventional wisdom holds that this was a beneficia l loss for the movie-studio 
plaintiffs, who then were able to take advantage of the marker for video tape rentals rhar 
later deve loped. 
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charged w ith constructive knowledge of the subseq uent uses. Even if the 
defendant knows that some customers will engage in such uses post-sa le, it 
cannot easi ly change its activity at the time of the sa le to ferret out th ose 
uses. And even if the defendant were later to receive information tha t would 
enable it easi ly to distinguish infringing from noninfringing uses, the infor-
mation would be ineffective beca use there wo uld be nothing at that point 
that the defendant could do- the item ha ving a lready been sol d, the defen-
dant cannot retract its contribution to the infringement. ln short, the Sony 
sta ndard recognizes tha t when the contribution and the knowledge occur at 
different times, li ability is unwarranted. 
The second limitation implied in the Sony sta nda rd is shown by the Court 's 
emphasis on the uses that are poss ible given the product's des ign (i. e., "capa-
ble of substantial noninfringing uses"), rather than the uses that the plaintiff 
claims currently exist. In other words, even if most users currentl y are using 
a particular technology for infringing uses, there may be other, noninfringing 
uses for the technology in the future that warrant a finding of no lia bil ity 
today. Thus, in the Sony case, the Court found that even though the amount 
of noninfringing use of video tape recorders may have been as low as 
9 percent at the time of the litigation,21 that amount demonstrated the 
product's abi lity to be used lawfully. This second limitation a llows beneficial 
technology to develop unhindered by the nature of its in i rial uses, thereby 
freeing inventors from the fear tha t their lega l fortunes rise or fall wi th the 
intent of early adopters. Notab ly, the Sony Court did not involve itse lf in the 
technology's design . It did not, for exa mple, consi der whether the video tape 
recorder could have eliminated or modified its recording capabili ti es in o rder 
to reduce the amount of infringing uses . Rather, it assessed the capabi lity of 
the des ign as it then existed in the market. 
Taken together, these two limitations serve to a ll ow new technology the 
breathing room necessa ry for development . The standard conditions li abi lity 
on the developer's knowing provision of technology designed for infringe-
m ent, not the provision of technology designed for copying . The video tape 
recorder, the cassette recorder, the photocopier, and the computer a ll easily 
survive such a standard, as they should. 
The Sony standard was at the core of the 2001 case of A& M Records , Inc. v. 
Napster, /nc.22 Napster provided a service by which users could trade elec-
tronic fil es over the internet. Users registered with the service and uploaded 
to Napster's se rvers the titles of the files they would make avai lable to share 
(but not the files themselves). Napster maintained these file titles in a central 
index; when an end user wanted to locate music, he would use Napster's 
21 See Metro-Goldwyn.-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Cc 2764, 2788 (2005) 
(Breyer, ]. , concu rring) . The lawful uses consisted of private, noncommercia l time-shifting 
in the home (taping programs to view late r), which was authorized by some copyright 
holders and constitu ted fair use in any event. 
22 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001 ). 
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oftware to search a ubset of this central index representing the files avail-
able from users currently online. If he found a ma tch, Napster's servers 
would send the IP address of the user with the desired file; a direct lP 
connection between the two users would transmit a copy of the file from one 
to the other ("peer-to-peer file sharing") . Because the index was the only way 
to locate files, and because the index was maintained on Napster's servers, 
apster was an integral part of the file t ransfers. If Napster shut down, the 
ability to locate files, and thus the ability to transfer them electronically, 
would go with it. 23 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found not only that Napster 
met the material contribution part of the analysis but also that it satisfied the 
knowledge requirement.24 In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit 
emphasized that it was clearly distinguishing "the architecture of the Napster 
system," which by itself could not provide a basis for liability, from "Nap-
ster's conduct in relation to the operational capacity of the system."25 Thus, 
following Sony, the Ninth Circuit held that Napster did not have the requi -
site level of knowledge merely from the constructive knowledge that "peer-to 
peer file sharing technology may be used to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights,"26 
given that the technology was capable of substantial noninfringing uses 
(trading noncopyrighted documents, or documents where trading is author-
ized, such as the use of the technology among various offices in a company). 
However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that apster had actual knowledge of 
the infringing conduct as a result of notices from the RIAA of infringing 
materi al being traded using the Napster search index,27 and that Napster's 
continued pa rticipation in that infringement - in other words, its failure to 
remove those song titl es from the index- was a knowing, material contribu-
tion to any future acts of infringement.28 In each such case, therefore, 
Napster was (in the court's vi ew) knowingly providing technology for the 
purpose of infringement. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit took a different approach 
to the constructive knowledge issue in a case ca lled In re Aimster Copyright 
Litigation.29 Rather than simply concluding that the service at issue (a file-
trading service that piggybacked on a popular instant messaging service) had 
substantial noninfringing uses, the court conducted a cost-benefit analysis 
that aimed to determine an "estimate of the respective magnitudes of these 
uses. "30 It is not enough, the Seventh Circuit concluded, that the system at 
issue be theoretically capable of noninfringing uses, since only a failure of 
23 /d. at 10 11- 12. 
24 /d. at 1020-22. 
25 /d. at 1020. 
26 /d. at 1020-21. 
27 /d. at 1020 and n.5. 
28 Jd. at 1022. 
29 334 F.3d 643 (7th Ci r. 2003) (Posner, j .), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1107 (2004). 
30 /d. at 649. 
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post-hoc litigation creativity would defeat the operator of such a system. 
Rather, the court noted, the focus should be on whether those uses are both 
likely and cost-justified; in other words, " if the infringing use are sub tan-
rial, then to avoid liability as a contributory infringer the provider of the 
service must show that it would have been disproportionately costly for him 
to eliminate or at least reduce substantially the infringing uses."31 The 
Seventh Circuit thus indicated a willingness to become involved in technol-
ogy design that was absent from both the Sony and the Napster decisions. 
It was against this backdrop of cases that the U.S. Supreme Court considered 
the technology at issue in Grokster. 
III. Background of the Case 
Grokster began when a number of motion picture studios, recording compa-
nies, songwriters, and music publishers (referred to collectively here with the 
name of the lead plaintiff, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. (MGM)), 
brought suit again t three defendants: StreamCast Networks, Inc., Grokster, 
Ltd., and Kazaa BY. All three defendants, at the time the complaint was 
filed, distributed peer-to-peer software free of charge via download to end 
users.32 The software, once launched from the end user's computer, con-
nected to other online users employing the same technology and enabled the 
end user to share certain designated files on his computer with those other 
users, creating, in effect, a network of users.33 Although many of the files 
shared were likely to be music files, the technology did not differentiate 
among the types of files transmitted and could be used to share text docu-
ments, video files, or software applications. 
The technology also provided a way for users to search for a particular file 
within the network of users who were currently online - for example, by 
name or by file type. A user could then initiate a direct connection between 
his computer and the computer on which the desired file was stored that 
would transfer a copy of that file to his computer.34 Significantly, neither the 
search nor the file rran fer involved use of the defendants' computer servers; 
once the end user had downloaded the requisite software, the defendants' 
participation was no longer required. 
31 Jd. at 653. 
32 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1032 (C.D. 
Cal. 2003), a(f'd, 380 F.Jd 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). In itially, 
the software distributed by the rhree defendants, although distributed under different 
brands, consisted of the same technology (ca lled " FastTrack"), which the defendants ob-
tained via license from its developer. StreamCast then moved to using nonproprietary peer-
to-peer technology (termed "Gnutella") under a sepa rate brand. After the case was filed, 
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MGM argued that the defendants were liable both for contributory copyright 
infringement and for vicarious copyright infringement. After discovery devel-
oped the facts related above, both parties moved for summary judgment, thus 
leaving the only issue before the court one of law: whether the defendants' 
conduct gave rise to liability for copyright infringement. The district court 
found, with little discussion, that many users of the software were engaged in 
direct copyright infringement by downloading works to which MGM held 
the copyright. 35 It then concluded, however, that because "su bstantial non-
infringing uses"36 for the software existed (the current and future distribution 
of, for example, noncopyrighted works or other works for which the copy-
right owner authorized distribution), constructive knowledge of end users ' 
infringement alone could not provide a basis for liability. Moreover, because 
the defendants did not have actual knowledge of the end users' copyright 
infringement at a time when they could take action based upon that knowl-
edge (for example, by withholding further assistance to such infringers), Ji the 
defendants could not be contributorily liabl e for their end users' infringe-
ment.38 Similarly, the district court found that, a lthough the defendants 
derived a financial benefit from the users' infringing activities (in that an 
increased user base increased the defendants' advertising revenue), the defen-
dants did not maintain a system that allowed them to monitor and control 
the network and so could not be held vicariously liable for end users ' copy-
right infringement. 19 Accordingly, the district court granted the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment, and, on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the N inth Circu it affirmed, concluding that the technology at issue "has 
numerous other uses [besides infringement], significantly reducing the distri-
bution costs of public domain and permissively shared art and speech, as well 
as reducing th e centralized control of that distribution."40 The U.S. Supreme 
Court agreed to review the Ninth Circuit's decision on December 10,2004.41 
IV. The Decision in the U.S. Supreme Court 
Before the Court released its opinion in the case, the conventional wisdom 
was that the case turned on whether the technology at issue was more like 
U /d. at 10.14-35. 
36 /d. at 1035 (citing So11y Corp. of Am. v. U11iversal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 41 7, 442 
I 1984 )). 
37 I d. at I 037. 
38 /d. at I 043. The di st rict court noted that a lthough each of the defendants was engaged in 
slightly d ifferent activ ities with respect ro the distribution of networking software (e.g., 
the use of certain users as "supernodes" to route search traffic efficientl y), id. at 1039-41 , 
these differences were not material ro the finding of conrributory liability. 
39 /d . ar 1044-46. Beca use MGM sought only prospective in junctive reli ef, the district court 
did nor consider whether past versions of the sohware might have given rise to liability. 
/d. at 1033. 
40 Metro-Goldwyn- Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 3!!0 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9 th Cir. 
2004), t'acated, 125 S. Cr. 2764 (2005) . 
41 125 S. Ct. 6!!6 (2004) (grant ing petition fur writ of certiorari) . 
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the video tape recorder- a technology ignorant of the uses to which it would 
eventually be put- or more like Napster- a service run by a company that 
had actual knowledge about the unlawful activities of its customers. Indeed, 
it might have been the case that much of the decision would turn on whether 
the Court viewed the defendants' technology as software over which the 
defendants had little post-sale control (as did the Ninth Circuit) or as a 
service that allowed continuing contact with customers. 42 Had this been the 
analytical conceit, the decision that the defendants' offering constituted soft-
ware would, one might expect, have led the Court to an analysis of whether 
that product was capable of "significant noninfringing uses" such that mere 
constructive knowledge of un lawful activity would be insufficient to result in 
liability. 
The focus of the Court's opinion, however, was on a variant of contributorily 
infringing activity noted in the Gershwin standard but ignored in the Ninth 
Circuit's opinion: inducement of infringement. By focusing on the defen-
dants' behavior rather than on the nature of the technology, this approach 
found support from all nine members of the Court. In an opinion by Justice 
Souter, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's opinion affirming the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants and remanded for recon idera-
tion of MGM's own motion for summary judgment. Although prognostica-
tors had expected Grokster to turn on an interpretation of Sony, the Court 
put that question to one side, noting that Sony was of little value becau e the 
Court was focusing here on the defendants' activity in inducing infringe-
ment, and there was "no evidence of stated or indicated intent to promote 
infringing uses" on Sony's part.43 In other words, given the difference in their 
facts, Sony did not have to reach the issue of inducement, and Grokster did 
not have to reach the issues of knowledge and material contribution. 
The Court concluded, therefore, that the Ninth Circuit's analysis had gone 
astray because the Ninth Circuit had interpreted Sony as having reached, 
and eliminated, this additional basis of liability. In the Court's view, the 
Ninth Circuit had inaccurately construed Sony to mean that "whenever a 
product is capable of substantial lawful use, the producer can never be held 
contributorily liable for third parties' infringing use of it" even when "an 
actual purpose to cause infringing use is shown by evidence independent of 
design and distribution of the product."44 This was not an entirely accurate 
42 Although, as the Seventh Circuit noted in Aimster, denominating an offe ring as a "service .. 
is not dispositive of rhe liability question, Aimster, 334 F.Jd at 648, the defendant's degree 
of control over future uses underlies the "material contribution" prong o f the standard. 
43 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2777 (2005). This 
conclusion is somewhat debatable given that, as Justice Blackmun noted in dissent, Sony's 
promotional marerials did encourage users to u e their video tape recorders ro " record 
favorite shows" or "build a library." Sony, 464 U.S. ar 459 (Biackmun, J., dissenting). The 
Grokster Court concluded that "neither of these uses was necessarily infringing." Grok-
ster, 125 S. Ct. at 2777. 
44 Grokster, 125 S. Cr. at 2778. 
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description of the inth Circuit's opinion, which misguidedly ignored, rather 
than eliminated, the inducement aspect of Gershwin's formulation. But by 
resurrecting the inducement theory of secondary liability, and thus targeting 
the defendants' particular activities apart from the mere distribution of 
technology, the Court succe sfully avoided the conceptual conflation that 
lurked at the heart of the case: the failure to distinguish between peer-to-peer 
technology generally (which almost certainly could not have been held to be 
unlawful) and any entity's particular use or distribution of such technology 
(the lawfulness of which would be an inherently fact-bound determination). 
Because the Ninth Circuit had not focused on other theories of secondary 
liability apart from the distribution of a particular product design with 
knowledge of its possible infringing uses, the Supreme Court was free to 
leave any further consideration of the Sony standard- such as how substan-
tial noninfringing uses must be before they qualify- for another day. 
Accordingly, although the notion of inducement as a basis for contributory 
copyright infringement a lready existed in the common law, the Court set 
forth the principle specifically: "(0 Jne who distributes a device with the 
object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expres-
sion or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the 
resulting acts of infringement by third parties."45 With the question posed as 
"Did these defendants induce copyright infringement by end users in ways 
other than simply distributing the technology?" the question became easy for 
the Court to answer. Indeed, "the classic case" of contributory infringement, 
the Court noted, occurs when one induces, entices, or persuades another to 
commit infringement (for example, in advertising or instruction manuals). 46 
In this case, the Court concluded, there was considerable evidence of intent 
to induce copyright infringement. The Court was wi ll ing to accept from the 
evidence in the record that "the vast majority of users' downloads are acts of 
infringement" and that "the probable scope of copyright infringement is 
staggering."4 7 The key fact was that, in the Court's view, the defendants 
were not "merely pa ive recipients of information [from the plaintiffs] 
about [such] infringing use. "48 Rather, the Court noted, there was abundant 
evidence that both defendants, from the first moment of distribution, 
"clearly voiced the objective that recipients use it to download copyrighted 
works, and each took active steps to encourage infringement."49 Such evi-
dence, in the Court's view, was of three types. First, the defendants attempted 
to capture the user market left when Napster ceased operations, such as by 
creating Napster-compatible software to harvest e-mail addresses of likely 
users of peer-to-peer networking software; using metatags reading "Napster" 
and "free filesharing' ' in their websites to attract users inputting those terms 
45 ld. a t 2780. 
46 /d . ar 2779. 
47 /d . a t 2772. 
48 /d. 
49 /d. 
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into search engines; creating promotional materials that referenced particu-
lar copyrighted material (such as "Top 40 music") that would be available 
via the network; and - in Grokster's case - choosing a name that was "an 
apparent derivative of Napster."50 Second, the defendants' business models, 
which depended on advertising revenue for viability, anticipated an increas-
ing user base, which in turn depended on " free access to copyrighted 
work. "5 1 And, finally, the defendants took no action to filter or otherwise 
restrict access to copyrighted works via the network. 52 
What this meant for the defendants at the time was clear from the Court's 
opinion. (As a procedural matter, the case was remanded either for trial or 
for a consideration of MGM's motion for summary judgment; Grokster 
settled in November 2005, but Streamcast is, as of this writing, still a party 
to the litigation.) What this means for developers of technology in the future 
is less clear. The Court offered some examples of acts on the outer bound-
aries of its declared standard: "mere knowledge of infringing potentia l or of 
actual infringing uses" is insufficient, as are, standing a lone, "ordinary acts 
incident to product distribution, such as offering customers technica l support 
or product updates." 53 To the contrary, the Court reassured, only "purpose-
ful, culpable expression and conduct"54 would suffice, leaving further elab-
oration of this test to future cases and future courts. Thus, it i uncertain, for 
example, to what extent a competitor marketing in the same genera l field of 
commerce as an infringer can attempt to attract that infringer's customers 
without being seen as inducing those customers to infringe. (It might be 
possible, for example, that a competitor seeks to draw such customers by 
offering them a legitimate product.) Similarly, the Court's focus on the 
defendants' failure to develop means to filter or otherwise restrict infringing 
activity on the network seems to embed the Court in questions of product 
design that not only are unwise from an in titutional competence standpoint 
but also seem to run afoul of the standard stated in Sony and reaffirmed in 
Grokster: that design alone is not a basis of liability unless there can be no 
other purpose for the design but infringement. Indeed, in a footnote that is 
likely to be the focus of future litigation, the Court noted : 
Of course, in the absence of other evidence of intent, a court would be unable 
to find contributory infringement liability merely based on a fai lure to take 
affirmative steps to prevent infringement, if the device otherwise wa capable 
of substantial noninfringing uses. Such a holding would tread too close to the 
Sony safe harbor. 55 
50 /d. at 2773-74; see also id. at 278 1 ("Grokster and StreamCast's efforts to supply services 
ro fo rmer Na pster users, deprived o f a mechanism to copy and distribute what were over-
whelmingly infringing files, indicate a principa l, if nor exclusive, intent on rhe parr of 
each to bring about infringement. "). 
51 Id. ar 2774. 
52 /d. 
53 Id. ar 2780. 
54 /d. 
55 /d. at 2781 n. 12. 
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And finally it seems overly broad to suggest that a service that depends 
wholly on advertising revenue for its support can thereby be seen as en-
couraging infringement rather than simply hoping for an expanded user 
base. To say that de ire for an expanded user base is proof that infringing 
activity is intended is to put the cart before the horse. 
Of course, the Court was not considering any of these activities on their 
own, and this is what makes it difficult to gain guidance from the opinion as 
to what other collections of activities risk liability for copyright infringe-
ment. Indeed, one might argue that Sony met each of these elements with 
regard to the video tape recorder: the advertising materials encouraged users 
to "build a library" (although the Sony Court was able to minimize this fact 
by noting that not all uses of the video tape recorder were infringing56 ); there 
was no evidence that Sony had taken any action to limit the infringing 
potential of the video tape recorder (by, for example, enabling the product 
only to play and not to record); and there was no suggestion that Sony did 
not desire a broad user base for its product that depended, at least in part, on 
the ability to record copyrighted content. In addition, none of the three types 
of evidence identified by the Court necessarily requires any communication 
whatsoever with end users, suggesting that mere intent to induce could be 
sufficient. Finally, it seems that the Court was infl uenced to some degree by 
the size of the problem in this case and not merely by satisfaction of an 
existing standard. Although the Court acknowledged the need to balance 
copyright protection with the development of technology, it also acknowl-
edged a strong pull toward liability in this case given the scope of infringe-
ment and the difficulties in effective enforcement given the size of the user 
baseY Thus, a collection of bad facts may wel l have resulted in rather 
opaque law. 
Two concurrences, one authored by Justice Ginsburg and one by Justice 
Breyer, offered opposite views on the question the majority opinion did not 
address: how the Sony issue should be resolved. Justice Ginsburg (joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy) concluded, based on the record, 
that the use of the defendants' software for infringement was "overwhelm-
ing"58 and that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate, "beyond 
genuine debate, a reasonable prospect that substantial or commercially sig-
nificant noninfringing uses were likely to develop over time"- an echo of the 
Seventh Circuit's analysis in Aimster.59 Justice Breyer, by contrast (joined by 
Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor), noted that the evidence before the 
lower court indicated that approximately 10 percent of files traded on Grok-
ster's network were noninfringing, a figure that qualified as "substantial 
56 See, e.g., id. at 2784 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (descr ibing the Sony Court's conclusion 
that "private noncommercial rime-shifting of te levision programs in the home" was either 
authorized o r legi timate fair use) . 
57 /d. at 2776. 
58 /d. at 2786 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
59 /d. (Ginsburg, j ., concurring). 
44 Heymann IIC Vol. 37 
noninfringing use" in Sony. 60 Justice Breyer a lso noted the Sony standard's 
emphasis on whether the product is "capable of" substantial noninfringing 
uses and suggested that while a 10 percent figure would not qualify as 
substantial if maintained over a period of years, it might serve as a baseline 
from which reasonably anticipated noninfringing uses could develop. 61 
Of the two, Justice Breyer's concurrence is more faithful to the values under-
lying Sony. By phrasing the Sony question as whether the defendants' soft-
ware products were capable of substantial noninfringing uses, Justice Gins-
burg merged the product with the particular use of the product. The point of 
Sony, however, is that the two are separate. Distribution of peer-to-peer 
technology generally cannot form the basis of secondary liability, just as the 
distribution of e-mail technology, instant messaging technology, the photo-
copier, and the video tape recorder cannot, even though all are technologies 
that permit end users to commit some- and perhaps a significant amount of 
-copyright infringement. Justice Breyer recognized this when he noted that 
the record showed ''a ignificant future market for non infringing uses of 
Grokster-type peer-to-peer software. "62 Indeed, he noted, quire rightl y, that 
the standard in Sony "seeks to protect not the Groksters of this world ... but 
the development of technology more generally. And Grokster's desires in this 
respect are beside the point."63 Maintaining this distinction is crucial to 
enabling the Sony standard to strike the right balance between copyright 
protection and technology development, providing clear guidance to devel-
opers, reducing uncertainty, and looking toward the future, rather than 
relying on a "static snapshot of a product's current uses."64 
Justice Ginsburg, by contrast, muddied the conceptual waters when she 
faulted the lower courts for not "sharply distinguish[ing] between uses of 
Grokster's and SrreamCast's software products (which this case is about) 
and uses of peer-to-peer technology generally (which this case is nor 
about) ."65 Whi le this is true insofar as the failure to make this distinction led 
the lower courts to ignore an inducement-based theory of contributory copy-
right infringement, it is not clear how this statement can be reconciled with 
Justice Ginsburg's earlier statement that there was insufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that commercially significant noninfringing uses would develop 
over time, a conclusion that is erroneous given the record with respect to 
peer-to-peer technology generally. If, in her view, "Grok ter's and Stream-
Cast's software products" are something different from " peer-to-peer tech-
60 /d. at 2788-89 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
6 1 /d. ar 2789 (Breye r, J., concurring) (li sting developmenr of many noninfringing uses, such 
as exchange of resea rch information, photos, and "sha reware"). 
62 /d. (Breyer, J. , concmring) (emphasis added) . Simila rly, Justice Breyer referred to the focus 
of the case as " [s]ervices like Grokster. " /d. at 2794 (Breyer, j., concurring) (emphasis 
added) . 
63 Jd. at 2790 (Breye r,]., concurri ng) . 
64 /d. ar 2791-92 (Breyer, J ., concurri ng) . 
65 /d. at 2786 (G insburg, .J., concurring). 
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nology generally," and if there is not any significant technological difference 
between the technology the defendants offered and other types of peer-to-
peer technology, then what are "Grokster' and StreamCast's software prod-
ucts"? Justice Ginsburg's exhortation suggests two possibilities: "Grokster's 
and StreamCast's software products" are defined as peer-to-peer technology 
at a particular point in time (such that the product is unlawful now given the 
kinds of use but may not be later if the percentage of lawful uses grows), or 
peer-to-peer tech nology promoted in a particular way. Because the latter was 
the basis for the Court's inducement theory, Justice Ginsburg seems to 
suggest that - for purpo es of the Sony standard - "Grokster's and Stream-
Cast's software products" are the former. But if whether the technology is 
lawful or unlawful is based on the kinds and numbers of uses as of the time 
of the litigation (and not on future use), then Sony's focus on potential uses 
has vanished, leaving in its place a requirement that early innovators are 
subject ro liability, while later distributors of the same technology (assuming 
any exist) can benefit from the variety of uses that have appeared over time. 
This is not what the Court in Sony intended. 
V Conclusion 
What guidance can technology developers take from the Grokster decision? 
The answer is not at a ll clear. While the decision might suggest that avoiding 
future enforcement efforts is as simple as limiting the claims made in one's 
marketing materials or by one's customer service representatives and refrain-
ing from activities designed to expand one's user base, this is unlikely to 
prove to be useful advice. As a matter of pure corporate governance, there 
will almost certainly be times when the exuberance of marketing teams or 
other customer contacts will outpace the restraint urged by legal counsel; 
even when developers are cautious, the opinion offers little in the way of 
particulars as to what other types of activity might constitute inducement. 
Relatedly, an instruction to eliminate any statements from marketing materi-
als and instruction manuals that might be construed as encouraging users to 
make copies of protected content might thwart legitimate and truthful de-
scriptions of technology that would seem to meet the Sony standard, such as 
photocopiers and digital cameras. 
In addition, the dueling concurrences, each of which garnered three votes, 
leaves the question of the future application of the Sony standard entirely 
open.66 While the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Ninth Circuit, it 
did not offer a direct rebuke to the circuit court's reading of the knowledge 
requirement of the Sony standard, instead noting that the Ninth Circuit focused 
on Sony ro the exclusion of the traditional inducement theory of contributory 
infringement. Thus, the question of how much of a technology's use must be 
noninfringing to qualify, and at what point in time, remains unanswered. 
66 This is particularly uue in light of the subsequent death of Justice Rehnquist (who joined 
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence) and retirement of Justice O'Connor (who joined Justice 
Breyer's concurrence) . 
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As Grokster begins to be applied in the lower courts, what will emerge will 
be a series of highly fact-dependent rulings that - one hopes - will outline 
the contours of what activity constitutes inducement. In the only copyright 
infringement opinion to have been issued by a federal district court since 
Grokster, as of this writing, the court found, after a full bench trial, that no 
indicia of inducement on the part of the defendant were present.6 7 A for the 
parties to Grokster, while the case was a loss for the defendants, it was 
equa lly a loss for the copyright owners, who are now faced with a series of 
fact-specific actions against an endless stream of software developers. The 
real question- how Sony should be adapted for the digital age- will have to 
wait for another year. 
67 Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bit;tream Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 877 ( .D. 111. 2005) (no liability 
where defendant did not target audience seeking copyrighted material; took steps to avoid 
infringement; and did nor have business model predicated on infringement). In MEMC 
Electronic Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicott Corp., 420 F.3d 1369 (2005), the 
U.S. Courr of Appeals for the Federal Circuit cited Grokster as authority in determining 
whether inducemenr of parent infringement had occurred. ld. at 1379·80. 
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